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The pleasure of receiving your invitation to address you is some-
what mitigated by the embarrassment I feel, as a layman, about being able
to contribute to a conference of the legal profession. Perhaps I can be of
some use by sketching in broad outline some of the conditions and forces
at work in a part of the world which is becoming increasingly important
-as a background against which to consider more specific issues and
problems of foreign trade and investment.
I propose to concentrate on foreign investment rather than foreign
trade. I do so partly because of the limits of time and partly because
investment for development is the main activity of the institution with
which I am associated, and I am therefore more familiar with it. You will
see as we go along that much of what I have to say is relevant to trade
as well as to investment.
The underdeveloped countries, which are my subject, include vir-
tually every nation of Asia, of Africa and of the Western Hemisphere
south of the Rio Grande. These countries cover about 60% of the world's
land area and include 67% of its population. Among them are countries
poor in resources and others rich in fertile land and minerals; countries
virtually empty of people and others where population presses hard against
natural resources; countries with the most varied social and economic
history and structure; countries covering the entire spectrum of political
organization and affiliation. Despite their diversity, they have certain
common characteristics. They are poor, compared to Europe, Canada, the
United States, Australia and New Zealand. They have low levels of
literacy and high birth rates. Their populations use primitive technologies,
requiring very little capital, in doing their daily work. The great bulk of
them live on, and make their living from the land; they produce pri-
marily for their own subsistence or for trading in their immediate, often
isolated, village communities, and they have little or no surplus for sale
and little money with which to buy goods from outside their communities.
Savings are likely to find outlets in relatively non-productive ways, in
speculative ventures, in conspicuous consumption, in idle hoards of gold
or commodities. The people are largely tradition-bound; few have any
managerial and technical experience. Values, incentives and institutions are
built up around a relatively static outlook on life.
Another common characteristic appears throughout the underde-
veloped world, and this is in some respects the most important. Govern-
ments and segments of the population are becoming increasingly self-
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conscious of their nationality and political integrity and are seeking to
better their material conditions. They are increasingly aware of the wide
gap between their own economic power and welfare and that of Europe
and the United States and they are determined to narrow the gap rapidly.
Economic development has become not only a political catch phrase, but
a positive goal-however vague and undefined-towards which political
leaders must strive if they wish to maintain their power.
Of course, I know of no country in which the entire population
lives in such a pre-industrial, even pre-commercial, setting. Indeed, it is
also a characteristic of underdeveloped countries that wealth and poverty,
the primitive and the modern, exist side by side in startling contrast. In
most underdeveloped countries there are well-established mercantile com-
munities fully familiar with every trick of trade and finance, and as
capable of reacting to a monetary motive as one could wish. Some have
a lucrative export trade which provides a large proportion of the national
income, though here again there is usually a spectacular contrast between
the machinery of the export trade and the level of living of the population
that produces for it. Many have highly skilled engineers and scientists.
Some have efficient and sizable modern industrial establishments. Not all
have a broadly-based drive towards development. While in some the drive
amounts to an obsession, in others it is opposed by powerful groups; for
development would bring about shifts in economic and political power
and important changes in family and class relationships and in philo-
sophical outlook.
What this adds up to is that the term "underdeveloped countries"
covers a diversity of conditions and that the problems of doing business
in one may be quite different from those in another. It is very hard to
generalize in such a way as to cover economic conditions affecting invest-
ment in Panama, the Congo, Iraq and Indonesia, or legal and social
problems affecting investment in Buddhist, Moslem and Catholic coun-
tries. Such generalizations as one might be tempted to make in these
cases are likely to be so general or so tentative as to be of limited useful-
ness to the trader or to the investor, who must be concerned not with the
generalized problems of underdeveloped countries, but with the specific
problems of the country in which he wants to do business.
Compared to the weight of their population and area, the under-
developed countries receive only a small portion of American overseas
investment. In the four years from 1950 through 1954, direct American
investment in enterprises abroad increased by $6 billion, of which 53%
went to Canada and Europe and another 25 % to Latin America. Invest-
ment in foreign securities increased by only $600 million, of which 83%
was in Canada, Europe and the International Bank.' Net private invest-
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enormous. About 20-25% of all U. S. imports derive from U. S. enter-
prises abroad. That includes 95% of all crude oil, 90% of nickel and
bauxite, 85 % of copper, 75 % of paper stock, 55 % of lead and iron ore,
etc., a large part of which comes from underdeveloped countries. The
earnings from direct investment abroad are quite good. Investment in
Canada, calculated at book value, yielded about 10.5% and in the rest
of the world 16.5% after taxes, while that of domestic enterprises
seemed to average about 11 7 after taxes. In individual industries the
results are similar, except in public utilities. By and large, investment in
underdeveloped countries yielded the higher returns.
If foreign investment is so profitable in underdeveloped countries,
why is there not more of it? Aside from the actual results just mentioned,
one could argue on principle that investment opportunities are particularly
great in the underdeveloped countries, which have plenty of labor and
natural resources but little capital and which should therefore give a
higher return for each unit of capital invested. This is another way of
saying that capital should move to areas that lack it but that have the
other factors necessary for production. In terms of the individual in-
vestor, the profits will be greatest where capital is most needed, which is
certainly the case in the underdeveloped countries. What, aside from the
competitive opportunities at home, is keeping the investor back?
Now, I take it for granted that, except in the most unusual cir-
cumstances, no one invests his capital for charitable or patriotic reasons.
He does so because he expects a return which, taking account of all possible
risks, he considers reasonable. If he invests abroad, a second consideration,
absent in domestic investment, looms equally large. He will invest if he is
sure that he can bring his profits home and, ultimately, repatriate his
original capital. The first problem is amenable to calculation, if not with
precision at least with reasonable assurance, although even "reasonable
assurance" requires familiarity with conditions in the country in which
the investment is to be made. What it amounts to is, will he sell enough
of the product he produces to assure him the profit he wants? That is, does
he have a market?
Perhaps the most important economic factor affecting investment
in underdeveloped countries, compared with which all others shrink into
insignificance, is the small size of the market. In most underdeveloped
countries, the size of the market for all but foodstuffs and a few other
basic necessities is severely limited. In some countries this may be the
result of small population. Would it make any sense, for instance, to build
a steel mill in Honduras, which has a population of 1.6 million? A
modern mill could provide all the many types of iron and steel shapes that
country needs in a few days, and would be idle the rest of the time unless it
could produce for export in competition with half a dozen highly in-
dustrial countries. But the smallness of the population is not the crucial
issue in determining the size of the market. At the heart of the matter is
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ment in the underdeveloped countries has averaged about $750 million
per year (of which $400 million in Latin America), compared with an
average of $850 million elsewhere. Of the total direct investment at
the end of 1954, amounting to $17.7 billion, 487 was in Canada and
Europe, and another 36% in Latin America. Of portfolio investment,
$5 billion was in Canada and Europe, $500 million in the International
Bank, and only $1.1 billion in the underdeveloped world. Evidently,
except for Latin America, the underdeveloped world holds little attraction
for American investment. Why is this so?
In my judgment, the most important economic ocstacle to American
private investment abroad is not peculiar to underdeveloped countries.
That obstacle is the wealth of competing opportunities with good prospec-
tive returns that exist in the United States. Unused resources and ex-
panding markets are, or have been so great and the development of tech-
nology has been so rapid that there has been relatively little incentive
to seek capital outlets and profits abroad, especially in areas in which
American businessmen have had relatively little experience. The return
on investment abroad has in general been higher than on investment at
home, but that premium has apparently not been high enough to com-
pensate for the risks and unfamiliarity of investing abroad, in face of the
beckoning opportunities for capital at home.
This factor probably lies at the heart of the small role that foreign
investment plays in the American economy and in American prosperity.
The fact that private long-term investment abroad has increased at the
rate of about $1.5 billion a year since the war, and has doubled 'since
then, may seem impressive. But, in perspective, it is not. The total foreign
investment of the United States amounted to only about 4%o of the repro-
ducible national wealth at the end of 1954; private investment represented
only 2.5 %. Capital outflows were only about 2% of total annual private
investment. Corporate earnings from investment abroad were much less
than 1 % of the national income. If the American economic position
in the world today bears comparison with that of the U. K. at the turn
of the century, then it is worth noting the relative performance of the two
countries. In 1914 a third of all private British wealth was overseas.
Were we investing at the same rate, that would mean an overseas invest-
ment of about $300 billion, compared with an actual $25 billion. The
British were then investing about 40% of their savings abroad. For us
today that would mean new outflows of $20 billion a year, compared
with an average $800 million. Ten percent of Britain's national income
was income from investment abroad; less than half of 1 7 of ours comes
from that source.
Evidently U. S. investment, in the aggregate, is marginal to Ameri-
can wealth, income and prosperity. But these comparatively insignificant
aggregate figures do not tell the whole story of the impact of foreign
investment. For specific industries and specific firms, that impact is
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the poverty, the low real income of the population, which often leaves
little beyond what is needed for subsistence. That is, productivity and
output are low; purchasing power is low; and effective demand is too
small to justify the large-scale production which accompanies and is in-
deed a purpose of capital investment. This condition is almost a definition
of an underdeveloped country. It is interesting to note, that one of the
most persistent delusions in American history has been the promise that
China, with its teeming millions, was a great potential outlet for American
goods. The promise never came off, for it confused population with
market.
The size of the market is undoubtedly the main factor in deter-
mining the pattern of American investment abroad. Direct private in-
vestment has tended to concentrate on production of food and agricultural
and mineral raw materials, not for markets in the countries in which the
investment was made but for the American market. Of the $6 billion of
direct investment from the end of 1950 to the end of 1954, about 51%
went to petroleum, agriculture and mining. If one looks at the under-
developed countries alone, more than 602% of investment was in those
fields; in the others, about 47%. On the other hand, 67% of all direct
investment in manufacturing, which means largely for local markets,
was in Canada and Europe, that is, in developed countries; 287o was
in Latin America; and only about 5 %o in the rest of the world. Of
total direct investment in 1954, in the developed countries, about 32%
was in the extractive industries generally; in all underdeveloped countries,
the percentage was 56; in those outside Latin America, it was about
80%. To a considerable extent the recent increase in manufacturing in-
vestment was brought about not by new markets, but by the wish to hold
markets abroad from which goods hitherto exported from the U. S.
might have been excluded by tariff barriers and other restrictions.
Here we can see a source of the close link between American invest-
ment and American foreign trade. I have already noted that 20 to 25
percent of United States imports originate from American enterprises
abroad, including the lion's share of certain goods needed in both peace
and war. One need only mention Venezuelan iron or Peruvian copper
or Brazilian manganese or Middle Eastern oil to make the point. Con-
versely, a substantial amount of American capital goods exports goes to
American enterprises abroad. The growth of American direct investment
is undoubtedly more closely connected with the requirements and expansion
of industrial production in the advanced countries than with the needs and
desires of underdeveloped countries. Should American production fall off,
the impact would be felt by American investors abroad as well as by the
host countries.
These statements about the market apply only to direct investment.
They do not apply to loans, either public or private, to foreign govern-
ments or to non-controlling purchases of private securities. As to the
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latter, there are very few outside Europe and Canada; for, in the under-
developed countries, enterprise is overwhelmingly individual rather than
corporate. Loans to public authorities constituted a large part of American
investment in the 1920's (about half). From 1946 to the end of 1954,
however, barely $300 million of foreign bonds were issued in the United
States, excluding those of Canada and the World Bank, and that sum in-
cluded the bonds of Israel, which fall into a special category. Taking ac-
count of redemptions and validations of existing issues and excluding
Canada and the World Bank, portfolio investment actually fell by about
$100 million. Evidently investors still remember the defaults of the
1930's, and are unaffected by the fact that only 7% of pre-war issues
are still in default. Evidently too they have little interest in fixed-return
securities, in view of the risks thought to be involved, and prefer to
maintain control of their resources. Moreover, institutions, which have
replaced individuals as the main investors, are often blocked by domestic
legal restrictions. And, finally, investors remain inhibited by the general
economic and political climate, of which I shall speak in a moment.
The U. S. Government, of course, is not daunted by the inhibitions
that dog private investors, since profit is not its motive. Its long-term
loans abroad have grown from $5 billion at the end of 1946 to $15.2
billion at the end of 1954, at a rate which was very high in the early post-
war period but which has since fallen off. Less than $1 billion of this
total was lent directly to underdeveloped countries. Yet, loans of this
kind are precisely what underdeveloped countries need most to achieve
their economic objectives: that is, capital for irrigation works, ports, high-
ways, railways, educational facilities and a host of activities which private
capital, foreign or domestic, does not or cannot finance, but on the exist-
ence of which private investment heavily depends. And this brings me to
a second category of economic problems facing foreign investment in
underdeveloped countries: the absence or inadequacy of basic physical
facilities.
A plantation in a Central American jungle must be accessible if
its produce is to be brought out. So must a tin mine in Malaya, which must
also have power. Five years ago in Ethiopia, it took a truck driver three
weeks or more to make the 250 miles from Addis Ababa to Jimma, the
heart of the coffee country. He might not return for several months,
perhaps because he was engaged in a lucrative smuggling trade over the
Sudanese border; but his firm could not check on him because there were
no telephone or telegraph facilities. The spectacular growth in the Turkish
economy until its recent set-back is often linked to the importation of
tractors; but just as important was the improvement and expansion of the
highway network, which opened up new areas, broadened the domestic
market and lowered transport costs, and the installation of new power
capacity and an electric grid in northwest Anatolia, which provided the
power needed for industrial expansion.
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In America we are inclined to take for granted the existence of
transport, power and communications facilities. Not that we always had
enough. Quite the contrary. But in the United States, somehow, the
growth of transport facilities and power capacity manages to keep not
too far behind the requirements of the country. In some of the under-
developed areas, where a start has hardly been made, the problem is an
urgent one.
As regards foreign investment in these fields, perhaps we are back
to the basic factor of the market. When an investor abroad is reasonably
sure of his market, he manages to create the roads and power facilities
he needs even in an underdeveloped country. A banana company hacks
its own path through the jungle and a mining enterprise erects its own
generator, because they are producing goods for a profitable market abroad.
The creation of such facilities in order to provide the basic underpinning
for the development of the host country, may be a long and expensive
task. Some such projects, a highway or a port, may be non-revenue earn-
ing and clearly outside the interest of the private investor. In some
countries, transport and utilities have been fenced off as the domain of
the government, to the exclusion of private enterprise, foreign o
domestic. In others, railway or power companies are subject to strict,
perhaps discriminatory, rate regulation, often for the deliberate purpose of
subsidizing other sectors of the economy, with the result that profits may
be negligibly low. In the underdeveloped countries as a whole, there seems
little opportunity for direct foreign investment in basic facilities unless
they are tied to a specific investment of another kind.
This field was once the main interest of foreign investors. Until
1914, most foreign investment took the form of loans to governmental
authorities and to private companies for the creation of basic facilities.
More than half of French and German foreign investments went to
governmental authorities; so did 30% of Britain's. Three quarters of
Britain's overseas investment was for ports, railways, waterworks and
other utilities. But another fact is relevant here. A full two-thirds of
Britain's investment in 1914 was in the so-called "new and empty coun-
tries", countries like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand
and the Union of South Africa, which had no long established cultures
and which were to a great extent populated by emigrant English men and
other Europeans. These countries were not like the underdeveloped coun-
tries of today. They were never significantly poor by comparison with
Europe; their technology was never far behind Europe's; their institutions
were essentially European, geared to economic growth.
The contrast between China and Japan illustrates my point with
regard to both markets and portfolio investment. In 1930, about 80%
of foreign capital in China was in direct investment, largely engaged in
export industries, and playing but a small part in the Chinese economy.
In Japan, on the other hand, three-quarters of all foreign investment
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took the form of loans to the government, made mostly before the first
World War, which were used in accordance with its ideas of national
development, largely for basic facilities. By the 20's, when a market
and public facilities had been created. Japan began to receive sub-
stantial direct investment. American exports to Japan in 1930 were al-
most twice as high as exports to China; imports from Japan were two
and three-quarters times imports from China.
Physical facilities are not the only missing essentials in underdeveloped
countries. They lack also what I might call "institutional technology," the
institutions necessary to mobilize and make effective use of capital. The
inadequacy of banking institutions, particularly for long-term lending,
is characteristic of many of them, which makes their position strange to
American businessmen. Nor is there likely to be a stock market. Few of
the underdeveloped countries have well-established marketing facilities
for industrial securities; and many such countries are only just beginning
to establish banks which will lend for more than ordinary short-term
commercial purposes. In some types of foreign investment, it is desirable
to be associated with domestic capital. It is not always easy to find it,
and not simply because it may be in short supply. Far more important is
the fact that such capital as may be available is more likely to show a
preference for traditional forms of investment, sometimes unproductive,
sometimes lines of activity which yield very high profits very quickly.
They are likely to shy away from production, particularly if it does not
yield substantial profits for some years. Even more serious for some
investors than the lack of domestic capital is the inadequacy of managerial
experience, technicians and skilled labor. The first two mean that man-
agers and technicians must be brought from America, at additional
expense; they involve the expenditure of time and money in training
local personnel. Labor in underdeveloped countries is often fresh from
the countryside, and the expense of training may be lost overnight when
a worker decides to return to his family farm to help with the harvest
or decides that he has earned enough money to carry him through the
rest of the year.
So much for the economic factors which are subject to fair estimation
in calculating whether or not an investment might be profitable. I
haven't mentioned all of them. There are many others; they vary from
country to country, and you can know them only from detailed knowledge
of the domestic scene. For instance, in a paper published this year entitled
"Establishing a Business in Thailand," the U. S. Departmnt of Com-
merce mentions, under the heading "Miscellaneous Overhead Costs," the
following item, which must come as a surprise to anyone not familiar with
Thailand:
The practice in Thailand whereby the establishment and opera-
tion of enterprises is often contingent upon letting public
leaders inactively participate in management-as members of the
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Board, as holders of free shares, or in some other form--con-
stitutes a factor which may be important in calculating costs.
We come now to the second major question facing the investor
in underdeveloped countries. Will he be able to transfer his profits and
repatriate his capital? Of course, the investor may not wish to transfer
his profits. And if a business abroad is profitable, the investor may never
wish to sell out. Some kinds of investment probably never will be sold
out. About half of American direct investment each year represents,
not fresh capital outflows from the United States, but the reinvestment
of profits. But most investors understandably wish to be sure, in advance,
that they can get their profits out and their capital back, if they so decide.
Here we come up against a difficult issue. Economic and financial
instability is prevalent in many underdeveloped countries and constantly
threatens in others. There are two main reasons for this fact. Firstly,
many of them are heavily dependent for their livelihood on the export
of a small number of agricultural and mineral products. For instance,
over 70%o of the exports of Chile consists of copper and nitrates; 50-60%
of the exports of Ethiopia consists of coffee; more than three-fourths of
the exports of Thailand consists of rice, rubber and tin. These exports,
dependent on demand abroad, particularly in the industrialized countries,
have been subject to wide fluctuations. When they decline in price or in
volume, the event is immediately registered in declining foreign exchange
earnings, government receipts and domestic purchasing power, situations
which call forth corrective action. A second important, and relatively
new source of instability is the fact that underdevcloped countries are
becoming increasingly committed to heavy investment expenditures as
part of their development program. Countries long accustomed to con-
servative monetary and fiscal policies are borrowing heavily to finance a
broad variety of projects aimed at economic development, and in the
process generate inflationary pressures which produce foreign exchange
shortages, as well as upset their pattern of investment. While they may
be aware of the serious consequences of excessive inflationary spending,
they often lack the technical information and machinery and the political
will to bring such situations under control until it is too late.
The threat of instability, or more precisely of inflation, is not only
a direct inhibitor of foreign investment, in that it makes the investor's
calculations highly uncertain; the knowledge that the governments will
take restrictive measures to counteract their difficulties also discourages
such investment. Exchange controls and other restrictions are usually
resorted to when balance-of-payments difficulties arise, for they are gen-
erally more acceptable politically and easier to administer than the stringent
fiscal and monetary measures which might strike more directly at the
heart of the matter. Exchange controls, when invoked, affect the transfer
of profits and the repatriation of capital.
The danger of financial instability is not unique in underdeveloped
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countries. Europe and America suffer from it too. If there is a differ-
ence in kind in the positions of the advanced and the underdeveloped
countries, it is that in the lopsided economies of the latter the impact
may be more serious and the quality of governmental management and
administration may be poorer. Here again, the very fact of underde-
velopment lies at the heart of the difficulty. Their efforts to balance
their economies, in the sense of diversifying them and making them less
sensitive to fluctuations of economic activity abroad, would considerably
mitigate their problem. So would, of course, the maintenance of a high
level of economic activity abroad.
Whether or not an investor goes into an underdeveloped country
depends also on a host of more or less intangible factors, which generally
come under the heading of "climate" or "atmosphere." The term
"climate of investment" covers all the many factors and attitudes in the
country in which the investment is to be made, which make the investor
either feel sure of, or fear for the safety of his investment. Chief among
these factors is the attitude toward private enterprise in general and for-
eign enterprise in particular. Among the 366 companies engaged in
foreign investment whom the Department of Commerce interviewed in
1952, "a large majority" referred to this factor, or its manifestations,
and thought it outweighed in importance the many other unfavorable
factors, the "petty annoyances." It appeared to be the conclusion of
the investors that "the role of the U. S. Government in encouraging
private foreign investment is minor" and that "the major impediments
...are entirely within the responsibility-if not within the control-of
the foreign government concerned." And chief of these impediments
was the question of "attitude."
Now, this is essentially a political issue. I want to comment on it
briefly. Outside of Latin America, virtually all underdeveloped countries
have long been under foreign political control. All of them have recently
acquired, are soon to get, or are hotly demanding their political inde-
pendence. In most of Asia and Africa, almost all trade and industry
have been carried on for a century by foreigners, sometimes the same
foreigners who exercised political control, sometimes foreigners long
resident in the country but who live in separate communities and main-
tain their separate identities. It does not require a Marxist outlook for
such people to link these facts, to become extremely jealous of their
political independence, to resent and limit foreign capital, and to try to
pursue such policies as would reduce their dependence on foreign markets
and supplies. This attitude of new governments is enhanced by the fact
that, to the surprise and disappointment of their peoples, a higher standard
of living did not automatically come with independence. While they plan
and work for economic improvement, the foreigner often provides a
good scapegoat.
One consequence of new found freedom has been that governments
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have almost universally begun to plan their economic development. Gov-
ernmental planning has a bad name in this country, though among the
underdeveloped countries it may mean everything or nothing: the uni-
versal forced plan of China; the plan which concerns primarily a growing
sector of government activity; the plan which consists only of an unco-
ordinated collection of projects; the plan which is a series of fiscal and
monetary policies designed to stimulate economic growth or to relieve
depressing conditions-that is, the kind of "plan" that prevails in the
United States today. Planning often carries with it various restrictive
measures. For instance, foreign exchange controls first appeared in the
world as a means of adjusting payments fluctuations, and have fre-
quently been used as instruments of economic warfare. Today, they are
often resorted to, not as a means of correcting a payments deficit, but in
an attempt to control investment and consumption or investment, par-
ticularly foreign investment, may be subject to careful governmental
screening, in an effort to assure that it will be used for purposes con-
sidered useful or necessary. But whatever the nature of the planning,
foreign business men must take into account the readiness of govern-
ments of underdeveloped countries to intervene when they think it neces-
sary, though investors may have no influence on these governments.
This readiness is sometimes so great as to inhibit foreign business. But
it cuts both ways. For the great bulk of the economic activity of the
governments of underdeveloped countries is directed towards providing
just those basic facilities-power, transport, communications, education,
etc.-which are considered especially affected by the public interest, for
which private capital is usually not available, and the lack of which is
so great an obstacle to foreign investment.
Many governments, however, do not limit themselves to such basic
facilities; for ideological reasons or because they can not find sufficient
domestic enterprise, they sometimes enter fields that American investors
usually consider reserved to private individuals. Apart from an occasional
threat of nationalization, what frightens foreign capital is the threat
of unequal competition from official enterprises. But this again may cut
both ways. While some governmental enterprises may be protected from
competitive imports, the same restrictions may also protect foreign enter-
prises in the same field.
The fear of foreign capital, an attitude which is sometimes directed
toward domestic private enterprise as well, may take very concrete forms.
It may be reflected in the nationalization and expropriation of foreign
property; in bans on foreign enterprise in such sectors as power, mining
or transport; in requirements that domestic capital must participate with
foreign capital even to the point of owning a majority of the shares; in
restrictions on the employment of foreigners; in controls on the transfer
of capital and profits; and in many other ways. Such measures restrict
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the field in which foreigners can operate and threaten them with inability
to collect their profits or to repatriate their capital.
I have the impression that the fear of foreign capital in underde-
veloped countries is lessening. If this is so, it is partly the result of
growing self-confidence; but even more, it is a result of a growing
realization that, with loans not coming fast enough, direct investment
and the technique and experience that go along with it are essential to
rapid development. Most underdeveloped countries have made policy
statements inviting foreign investment to participate in their development,
although such statements are not always followed by concrete action
to reduce administrative obstacles or by positive inducements. Last year,
a United Nations study found that many measures had been taken to
reduce the obstacles to capital movements created by previous govern-
mental action, and to provide special incentives to private investors. It
found that most countries maintaining exchange controls had adopted
more liberal policies regarding transfer of profits and had given assurances
concerning repatriation of capital. At the same time there had been some
clarification regarding conditions of entry of capital and restrictions on
ownership and control.
The screening of investments and their submission to controls of
various kinds-however annoying-are not in themselves so serious an
obstacle; American businessmen abroad have become accustomed to work-
ing profitably under controls of many kinds and are learning to recog-
nize the legitimacy of the aims of underdeveloped countries. What is
more serious for them is the fact that regulations are often created, not
by law, but by administrative decisions taken in each individual case, that
such decisions can easily be changed if balance of payments or other
problems arise, and that administrative actions may be arbitrary, whimsical
and without recourse.
I must also mention certain social and cultural facts that bear on
the atmosphere or climate for investment. Aside from its oil interest in
the Middle East, American investors have generally stayed relatively
close to home, to people who shared in the main a common historical
tradition, moral outlook and similar concepts of law and equity. The
bulk of overseas private American investment in underdeveloped countries
has been in nearby Latin America. However, the greater part of the
underdeveloped world lies in Africa and Asia. Although some of these
countries-China, India, the Arab World-have profoundly influenced
our own culture, they do not share to so great an extent our historical,
legal and moral traditions. Theirs are quite different ways of living and
thinking. We are relatively unfamiliar with peoples who live in a
subsistence economy; or who, like the man I knew in Ethiopia, had a
large tea plantation but never harvested his tea because social prestige
came to him from ownership of the plantation not from the income it
could yield; or who worship the cow rather than use it; or who have no
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legal codes; or who keep one set of books for the tax collector, another
for their partners, and a third for themselves; or who place a higher value
on leisure and other non-economic goods than on income and hence may
work less in proportion as their incomes rise; or who place a very high
premium on a traditional way if life; or who look down on business
as an inferior way of life. Some of these views were characteristic of
Western society not so long ago and still show up in our thinking. Busi-
nessmen may find it a little difficult to know how to deal with peoples
who still hold them, especially while opportunities still beckon in the
U. S., where you think you know reasonably well where you are. I do
not want to make too much of these social and cultural differences, for
our increasing familiarity with Asia and Africa and their gradual economic
development will reduce their importance.
To sum up, aside from the general factors that affect American
investment everywhere, there are others particularly characteristic of
underdeveloped countries. Some stem directly from the very facts of
their backwardness; some from the political attitudes and policies that
seem to predominate among them; and some from the specific laws and
regulations that embody those attitudes and policies. Their reliance on a
small number of export goods whose prices fluctuate widely, and the
consequences of their efforts to attain a condition of sustained, rapid
economic growth often create additional dangers for the investor. Given
the fact that many of their governments are new, inexperienced and
under heavy pressure, there may be little confidence that, when serious
problems arise, they will be able and willing to take the difficult and
unpopular measures necessary to put their houses in order. Perhaps all
investment is, in the last analysis, an act of faith; but no one but a
gambler puts up money unless he feels that the circumstances affecting
his investment are predictable with reasonable assurance. In many under-
developed countries the difficulties are such that predictions concerning
long-term investment are fairly uncertain.
The importance of some of these difficulties will disappear as Ameri-
can investors gain knowledge of and experience with the underdeveloped
countries. Some may be minimized by U. S. Government action, by such
measures as investment treaties, investment guarantees, and tax incen-
tives, although it appears doubtful that such action will have a conclusive
effect. Other, more important ones can be relieved only by the direct
action of the governments of the underdeveloped countries. But the most
persistent will not be relieved or removed until underdevelopment gives
way to improved productivity, greater output, a rising standard of living,
and institutions geared to economic growth.
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